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This paper was prepared for the Workshop on Trade and Wages at the American Enterprise
Institute, September 10, 1993. It draws, and builds, on earlier work by Bhagwati (1991a),
done at the Russell Sage Foundation whose financial support during 1990-1991 is gratefully
acknowledged. In that paper, the contention that trade was depressing the real wages of the
unskilled was first challenged by using the general-equilibrium (Stolper-Samuelson)
argumentation of trade theory to analyze the claims to that effect in the emerging labor-
economists' studies of the question, and an alternative explanation of a possible adverse
impact of trade on wages also advanced in terms of the effect of an increased randomization
of comparative advantage in different manufactures leading to more rapid turnover among
them by the unskilled resulting in the reduction of incremental rewards due to staying on
the job longer. The paper also draws on work by Dehejia (1992b) who models the
alternative approach just described. In revising this paper, we have profited from the
comments of the workshop participants, especially of Susan Collins. Conversations with
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Where does the threat to Free Trade come from today? Not from the developments
in the theory of imperfect competition in product markets which defined the scientific
revolution in trade theory in the 1980s: that revolution is now absorbed and its major figures
have returned to the fold of Free Trade as leaders of other such revolutions have done
before them (see Bhagwati, 1992). Instead, there are now, in our judgment, two new
threats, each posing great danger.
The first threat comes from the proliferation of demands for Fair Trade or Level
Playing Fields as preconditions for Free Trade. Where conventionally such demands were
confined to foreign subsidies and predatory dumping, they have now multiplied to a variety
of domestic policies and institutions: among them environmental and labor standards and
technology policy. The presumption today is that diversity among countries in these
domestic policies is harmful to the case for Free Trade, and that Free Trade with such
diversity, instead of being mutually beneficial, will lead to predation at one's expense. It is
evident that the difficulty of achieving harmonization of these several domestic policies (e.g.
even in the EC where political congruence is far greater than among nations trading at
arm's length) and the ease with which such demands can be multiplied to new areas of
diversity by protectionists, make the task of liberalizing trade or maintaining open markets
that much more difficult.1 The problems that NAFTA has run into with the
xBhagwati( 1991c), in the Harry Johnson Lecture on The World Trading System at Risk.
identified this as one of the major problems confronting the world trading system today.
Subsequently, Ford Foundation has supported a major Project on the subject of Fairness
Claims and Gains from Trade, addressed precisely to the question of the virtues and vices
1
environmentalists and the labor unions in the US because of different and lower
environmental and labor standards in Mexico, the strong opposition to the GATT and to
the Uruguay Round's completion around the Dunkel Draft by the environmental NGOs, and
the Clinton administration's capture by the Japan-fixated revisionists and the surrender of
key administration economists to demands for managed trade because Japan's domestic
institutions are "different" and allegedly lead to a lack of level playing fields for market
access, are a reminder of the grave importance that the question of Fair Trade has acquired
today.
But the other issue that imperils Free Trade as much is the fear that has grown here
and in Western Europe that the freeing of trade with the poor countries of the South will
hurt the real wages of the unskilled. The Russian proverb goes: fear has big eyes. But the
fear in this instance is prompted by the stagnation of the proletarian wages in the US in the
1980s and the substantial increases in European unemployment (which has presumably
substituted for the fall in wages) during the same period. There is real cause for worry. At
a time when the capacity of the Western states to maintain, leave aside raise, social
expenditures to countervail the market-determined declines in real wages has been crippled
(as witness the fate of the original Clinton budget proposals), and when the declinist rhetoric
of the election campaign reinforced pessimism about the American economy's future, it is
of diversity (in domestic policies and institutions among trading nations), directed by him
and Professor Robert Hudec of Minnesota Law School. Nearly thirty international and
other economic theorists, international lawyers and political scientists are writing
analytically-oriented papers with policy implications. The findings will be presented at a
June 1994 Conference in Washington, D.C., organized by the American Society for
International Law.
not surprising that workers have become fearful of real wage stagnation or decline and, with
it, of trade which they believe (but without good cause, as we will suggest) is an important,
if not the main, cause of this baleful phenomenon. While Marx's prediction of the
immiseration of the proletariat was proven wrong by history, will Marx strike again now
through the integration of the North with the South in freer trade?2
Indeed, it is curious that there has been a reversal of attitudes among the countries
of the North and of the South when trade between them is appraised. During the 1950s and
1960s, much of the South regarded trade with the North as a threat, not as an opportunity,
was fearful that without protection it could not industrialize, and turned to import
substitution while the North was opening to the South (as to itself) through extensive
liberalization. Today, starting with the 1980s, there have been fearful voices in the North,
dreading trade with the poor South as a recipe for descent into the wages and working
conditions of these impoverished nations, whereas many in the South now see trade with the
North as an opportunity, not a peril. The contrast between Mexico's and the US Congress'
reaction to NAFTA is a stark example of this role reversal.3
In this paper, we want to address this fear, prevalent in the North. There is little
2Scholars of Marx are, of course, divided over the question whether, in addition to his
prediction of a falling rate of profit, Marx did indeed predict also a falling real wage for the
proletariat. But enough numbers of scholars, and much of the public, believe that he did,
justifying our allusion above.
3We speak in aggregate terms of fears and opinions, fully aware that there are
exceptions to the fears of trade in the North (indeed in the US Congress on NAFTA as
well) and to the embrace of trade as an opportunity in the South (as among leftist political
parties in India). Nonetheless, the central thrust of intellectual and policymaking opinion has
indeed changed favorably in much of the South and the fears have grown (though not yet
overwhelming policy) in much of the North.
prospect that we can get much farther towards Free Trade if this issue is not addressed
clearly and persuasively. We will not present any serious empirical work of our own,
confining ourselves instead to clarifying the issues from the viewpoint of international trade
theory and relating the arguments to empirical evidence available from others' studies of the
issues at hand. Directions for future research should emerge from our analysis.
II. FACTOR PRICE EQUALIZATION (FPE): A THEORETICAL CURIOSUM OR
INESCAPABLE DESTINY?
Interestingly, the major theoretical construct which, implicitly or explicitly, has
provided the intellectual support, and lent the air of plausibility, to the fears in the North
of immiseration of the unskilled from freer trade with the South has been the celebrated
Factor Price Equalization (FPE) theorem [and the Stolper-Samuelson (SS) theorem which
shows the adverse impact of Free Trade on the factor of production that is scarce in the
country relative to abroad in the country's trading partners, i.e. presumably unskilled labor
in the North vis-a-vis unskilled labor in the south, relative to other factors of production
such as capital].4
It is interesting, of course, that when Paul Samuelson wrote his famous pair of
articles on the FPE theorem in The Economic Journal in 1948 and 1949, the theorem was
4In the symmetric nxn case, the FPE theorem implies the SS theorem (as stated above),
but the SS theorem does not imply the FPE theorem. In principle, it is enough to have the
SS theorem to generate the fears that, if one is importing labor-intensive goods from the
poor, labor-abundant South, Free Trade will harm the real wage of labor.
considered at first to be implausible5 and hence possibly wrong6, and then to be little more
than a theoretical curiosum. At the same time, when Wassily Leontief (1953) came up with
his startling finding that the US was exporting labor-intensive exports, the search for
explanations that was set off primarily focused on the reasons why the FPE theorem,
building on the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model, would not hold in the real world
because one or more of the sufficiency conditions (such as the absence of factor-intensity
reversals) were unrealistic. In short, the approach to the FPE theorem was not that it
defined reality; rather it was that the theorem provided the researcher with the necessary
clues as to why it did not.
By contrast, economists have generally tended to regard FPE today as an inescapable
destiny, with the (unskilled) proletariat facing inevitable immiseration or , at minimum, a
heavy drag on the rise of its real wages. Two examples should suffice.
* At a Williamsburg retreat for Congress freshmen after the last election, organized
by AEI and Brookings, where one of the authors (Bhagwati) and Lester Thurow were joint
panelists, Thurow (an influential Democrat) reminded his audience, in the context of
5Paul Samuelson wrote the second article because the first one met with skepticism and
the Economic Journal had to destroy in proof two articles, including one by the celebrated
Cambridge economist Pigou, questioning the FPE theorem after Samuelson's first article
appeared. Pigou remained skeptical and asked Richard Kahn if Samuelson had consulted
a mathematician for his (univalence) proof. Informed that Samuelson was one himself,
Pigou reportedly replied: I mean a British mathematician.
6Gunnar Myrdal, and others, also found the FPE theorem implausible because they
equated the equalization of real wages in the theorem with per capita real income
equalization. Obviously, the latter would still be different in the Heckscher-Ohlin-
Samuelson world of identical technologies but different capital-labor endowment ratios.
NAFTA, of the economists' FPE theorem and its implications (drawing from it, of course,
not protectionist conclusions but the prescription to raise the skills of our labor force).
* Let us quote the celebrated author of FPE, Paul Samuelson himself, in a speech
in Italy in 1992, adding the caveat that it is not meant to be a scholarly analysis of the
matter at hand:7
First, any top-notch jobs that used to pay well have not disappeared
from the face of the globe. They have merely migrated from Europe and
North America to Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia,
and elsewhere. (The tennis racket I play with comes from Korea. My partner
plays with one made in Taiwan. These words are written on a word processor
from Japan. So it goes.)
Have the jobs migrated permanently? Or will they come back? Can
good governmental policies bring them back?
Last December when I attended a Nobel Jubilee, I was being driven
to the Stockholm airport. Along the road we passed many of Sweden's best
factories. They seemed to the tourist's eye to have lost some of their bright
glitter and busy-ness. "No wonder", I thought, "that the miracle of the
progressive Swedish welfare state has petered out since 1970. Now there is
nothing that these factories can do which cannot be done almost as well in the
Pacific Basin — and often with Asian labor at real wage rates only half that
prevailing in Sweden. And surely much the same can be said about factories
in Turin, Brussels, Birmingham and Chicago. As Madrid and Barcelona begin
to enjoy higher living standards, surely they too will begin to encounter
effective competition from the developing nations that now master modern
routines and have access to up-to-date technical knowledge."
Let me not exaggerate. Of course, the most resourceful Swedish and
American operations can survive at some positive level. But all of us cannot
be above average. As the billions of people who live in East Asia and Latin
America qualify for good, modern jobs, the half billion Europeans and North
Americans who used to tower over the rest of the world will find their upward
progress in living standards encountering tough resistance.
7Besides, the quote is only an excerpt of a speech that contains several shrewd
observations on the relevance of Free Trade at the end of the 20th century. Cf. Paul
Samuelson (1992).
But if economists find the FPE argumentation inherently plausible as defining an
inevitable pressure on the real wages of the unskilled in today's developed countries, with
their presumed freer trade and further freeing of trade with the poor countries, we must not
forget two countervailing arguments, one theoretical and one empirical.
The theoretical, which we develop more systematically below, simply resurrects the
earlier view, albeit with more sophistication and greater evidence, that FPE's heavy hand
is far more frail than currently imagined.
The empirical, at the gut level, is simply that the phenomenon of the drag on real
wages of the unskilled appeared in the 1980s when the US (and the EC) were turning to
protectionism instead of opening their markets extensively to the developing countries as
during the 1950s and 1960s. And the same goes for the inflow of foreign investment into
the US, whether direct foreign investment (DFI) or the flip side of our current account
deficit, both of which show a net increase in augmentation of US capital from foreign
sources in the 1980s, both absolutely and relative to the 1950s and 1960s. [Lipsey( 1992)].
Thus, casual empiricism suggests exactly the opposite of what is generally believed! If these
facts on trade barriers and foreign investment are confirmed by careful analysis, we have a
paradox on our hands from the viewpoint of those who think otherwise: a paradox that
could be resolved along the lines developed by us in Section V.
But it is not just the FPE theory's seeming plausibility that has damned foreign trade
with the South as a significant cause of the immiseration of the unskilled. The early
presumption to that effect was also fed by notable empirical studies by some of today's
leading labor economists. In particular, the study most cited, both in academic circles and
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in the media (see Passell, 1992), was the 1990 study by Borjas, Freeman and Katz (1992)
which concluded that the 1980s had indeed seen trade affect US unskilled wages adversely.
While this study seemed to draw on trade-theoretic concepts (arguing that the trade had led
to an effective, relative augmentation of unskilled labor supply in the US and thus depressed
its real wage), we argue below that it really did not and that their argument was insufficient
for the conclusions reached.8
In the following therefore we first consider why the FPE theorem, and additionally
the SS theorem generally implied by it, are not quite an adequate guide to thinking about
the problem at hand. Then, we consider in depth why the Borjas-Freeman-Katz (1992) and
Murphy and Welch (1991) studies that alerted us to the adverse impact of trade on US real
wages were not well grounded in general-equilibrium theory of the type that underlies the
FPE and SS theorems and indeed much of conventional trade theory, thus leaving unproven
their case (which implicitly drew on such reasoning).
8In doing so, we will draw primarily on Bhagwati (1991a) (1991b). Recently, Lawrence
and Slaughter (1993) have endorsed this critique in their analysis of the problem of trade
and wages. Their empirical analysis provides additional evidence, supplementing that in
Bhagwati and calling even more compellingly into doubt the Stolper-Samuelson
argumentation.
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Why FPE and SS Theorems are Inadequate Guides to Reality
If we look at the assumptions that underlie the FPE theorem, it becomes immediately
obvious that they are extraordinarily demanding. Few would find the theorem compelling
as a guide to thinking about the real world if only they were familiar with these assumptions
(without which the iron hand of FPE theorem on real wages of the US unskilled cannot be
taken seriously).
Thus, the FPE theorem requires that technology (as also tastes) be identical across
trading countries. But then, despite identical knowhow, South and North can .de facto be
in different technological worlds if the production functions, while identically shared, are
characterized by possible factor intensity reversals (such that the same good, at the same
goods prices, is intensive in its use of factors differently in South and North) and the relative
factor endowments are such that South and North are actually characterized by such
reversals. Production functions which can lead to such reversals of factor intensity include
CES, where different constant elasticities of factor substitution between sectors are sufficient
to create such reversals.9 Much empirical work, done after the Leontief paradox (alluded
to above), underlines the distinct possibility that such reversals, both potential and actual,
9This was first noted by Minhas (1962) in a classic paper, based on his Stanford
dissertation. In trade theorists' language, factor intensity reversal possibility means that the
capital-labor ratios in the two goods will cross over at some wage-rental ratio. If factor
endowments are such that the two trading groups, South and North, are on opposite sides
of the cross-over, then the same good will be capital-intensive in South and labor-intensive
in North in trade. I.e. technology will cle facto be different in equilibrium, even though
technological knowhow is identical between North and South.
are not theoretical curiosa at all.10 When such reversals arise, evidently both South and
North can have rising real wages of unskilled labor thanks to free trade.
Differences in technological knowhow itself can lead to a similar outcome, of course.
Once again, while the spread of multinationals and the rapid diffusion of technology have
narrowed this possibility, this has been so primarily among the developed countries (where
convergence of knowhow has been documented by Baumol et.al.) and manifestly knowhow
differs across North and South. One can then readily show again the possibility that free
trade will increase the real wages of unskilled labor in both South and North.
Yet another way in which technology can differ across trading countries in
equilibrium is , of course, when scale effects operate. Scale economies, whether modelled
in the old way to allow for perfect competition or in the new way where they lead to
imperfect competition, will also enable real wages to rise in both North and South from free
trade. And few would deny that scale economies are relevant.
Thus, there are many ways reasons why the presumption that real wages in the North
and the South will converge as a result of Free Trade can be considered unrealistic. We
will develop here only three, which we consider to be particularly pertinent, and relate them
to the SS theorem instead, assuming that the Rich country is importing (unskilled) labor-
intensive goods and exporting (human and physical) capital-intensive goods and that the
terms of trade improve when trade is freed. In this (2x2) version of the theorem, which is
10See, for instance, the extended review of such work in the early survey of trade theory
in Bhagwati (1964).
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consonant with the FPE theorem, the real wage of unskilled labor falls.11
I. Scale Economies: We have already indicated that scale economies can invalidate
the SS theorem, causing both factors' real wages to rise. The reason is obvious: the
redistributive effect which militates against the real wage of unskilled labor in our instance
can be outweighed by the lifting-all-boats effect of scale economies on the marginal products
and hence real wages of both factors.
The first theoretical demonstration of this phenomenon was by Arvind Panagariya
(1981) who modelled scale economies in the old way where they were external to the firm
but internal to the industry, thus retaining our ability to work with models of perfect
competition.
Helpman and Krugman (1985) established the same conclusion in the context of scale
economies internal to the firm, and hence under imperfect competition. Their analysis was,
however, restricted to the special case where the output per firm did not rise with trade so
that the added gains from trade were due to variety rather than reduced cost thanks to scale.
Brown, Deardorff and Stern (1993) have now produced a more general and illuminating
analysis allowing for both these (and other) effects.12
nThus, instead of focusing on whether there is convergence of real wages in South and
North, we focus directly on the question on center stage: will cheaper labor-intensive
imports from the South under freer trade cause our real wages of the unskilled to fall? In
principle, of course, it is theoretically possible for the latter to occur while FPE fails: e.g.
the factors that militate against SS, detailed above, may hold in the South and not in the
North.
12Their Michigan CGE model, applied to Mexico, and incorporating imperfect
competition due to scale economies, also predicts a rising real wage for the US from
NAFTA.
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Diversification: The SS theorem (as also the FPE theorem) depend on the equilibria
under autarky and free trade lying in the diversification cone, i.e. trade should not lead to
complete specialization. When it does, the unique relationship between goods and factor
prices breaks down: while the factor prices are unique at complete specialization on a good,
goods prices are manifestly not because rising prices for the good will be compatible with
continued specialization on the good.13
Equally, while the SS ^ distributive effect operates as long as trade shifts production
towards a good without causing complete specialization, once specialization is achieved it
follows that any further rise in that good's (relative) price will mean that both factors will
gain from it: the lifting-all-boats effect from this improvement in the terms of trade
(implied by the rise in the relative price of the specialized good where, and in terms of
which, their reward is fixed at specialization) will ensue. The net effect could be to leave
both factors better off under free trade than under autarky.14
But this lifting-all-boats effect will help each factor proportionately to how much it
consumes of the cheaper imported goods, of course. Hence it is pertinent to observe, that
13We are working here with the 2x2 version of the SS and FPE theorems. For higher
dimensionality, see Ethier's (1984) fine review.
14We deliberately compare autarky with free trade because, when either of the equilibria
being compared has tariff revenues being generated, we must make assumptions about how
the revenue is disposed of. Where it is assumed to be redistributed to the factors qua
consumers, we must distinguish between the effect of the trade policy in question on real
wages and real incomes (inclusive of revenue transfers) as in Bhagwati (1959) and
subsequent analyses of the SS theorem. This distinction is clearly important in policy
discussions, as noted earlier: the adverse effect on real wages of trade, if any, could be
offset by fiscal policy in principle, especially if trade leads to greater income and hence
greater tax capabilities.
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as the Work of William Cline (1990, pp. 201-206, especially table 8.3) on textiles shows and
as casual empiricism suggests for other imported goods such as low-quality footwear, the
groups at the bottom of the income distribution (which must include the unskilled)
disproportionately spend their incomes on imported goods whose prices are heavily
influenced by protection (such as the VERs on footwear and the MFA on textiles).
Deardorff and Haveman (1991) have made the complementary observation that the invoking
of administered protection has been typically for industries which are not intensive in the
incidence of poverty in their workforce, suggesting that protection so given is, in its direct
effect, to the (relative) disadvantage of the industries that are and hence of the poor.
Trade and Competition: The lifting-all-boats effect can also arise if trade means
more competition and discipline, causing x-efficiency effects which may be captured
analytically as Hicks-neutral technical change. If we do this, and if we assume that the
effect operates throughout the economy, in both traded sectors, then clearly both factors get
their real wages improving from this, countervailing and possibly reversing the fall in the
real wage of the SS-impacted factor.
But, even if we were to assume that the production-function-improvement arises
differentially more in the import-competing sectors, then we can see immediately from the
early work on the general-equilibrium income-elasticities of supply under technical
change15 that, ceteris paribus. the effect will be to raise the real wage of the factor
intensively used in these sectors: i.e. of unskilled labor in our instance.
The econometric evidence on this hypothesis is hard to find. However, Jim
15Cf. the beautiful paper by Findlay and Grubert (1959).
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Levinsohn's (1993) recent work on the imports-as-competition hypothesis, while not exactly
specified in the manner suggested here, is successful in testing that hypothesis with the use
of Turkish industry data under near-controlled-experiment conditions. It suggests that our
specification of the effects of trade on technical change via competition may also be borne
out. As in many areas we discuss in this paper, we must confess that ideas and hypotheses
outrun plausible econometric evidence, suggesting more questions than answers for empirical
research.
Convergence: To Whose Real Wage?
Even though we do not consider the FPE theorem (and the SS theorem) to be
compelling, for the foregoing reasons, suppose that convergence of real wages of the
unskilled will occur as a result of trade between poor and rich nations. Will this then mean,
as Ross Perot and Pat Choate (1993) have argued in their recent anti-NAFTA tract, that
(say) NAFTA "will pit American and Mexican workers in a race to the bottom"? In short,
will convergence get US real wages down to the Mexican levels prior to NAFTA, or will it
raise the latter up to American levels prior to NAFTA? Where will the real wages settle
in each country?
In the context of NAFTA, given the relative sizes of US and Mexico, we would guess
that good prices will gravitate towards US prices: so, then, will factor prices. For freer trade
in the world economy, between South and North, a gut-answer is harder to give. We need
to investigate the question analytically before we can give an informed answer; to our
knowledge, no such analysis exists currently. But it is clear that the widespread presumption
14
that, in case of convergence (which we have argued need to be expected anyway), the real
wages in the rich countries will gravitate down towards the levels in the South appears to
be based on panic rather than logic.
Early Labor Studies
Should we nonetheless have changed our minds in light of the early labor-economists'
studies, especially by Borjas-Freeman-Katz (1992) and by Murphy and Welch (1991), which
attributed a definite role to international trade in explaining the unhappy behavior of the
real wages of the unskilled in the 1980s?
Excellent as these studies are, our major source of dissatisfaction with them, and
hence our inability to admit them as evidence in favor of the thesis they support, is that
nowhere do they build on the essential fact that trade should impact on goods prices in the
desired direction before anything can be inferred concerning the trade-induced effects on
factor rewards.16 We will consider this by examining the Borjas-Freeman-Katz study which
was available by mid-1990, has been much cited by economists and in the media [cf. Passell
(1992) in The New York Times)] and has provided intellectual support to those fearful of
the effects of trade on real wages of the unskilled.17
16This is, of course, at the heart of the FPE and SS theorems and, indeed, is a central
part of the general-equilibrium theory of international trade.
17Deardorff and Hakura (1993), in their companion paper to ours at the workshop,
suggest alternative questions. For instance, if technical change saving on unskilled labor
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Borjas, Freeman and Katz essentially compute the unskilled labor embodied in
American imports (using the observed coefficients of labor use in domestic import-
competing industries) and in American exports, treating the former as (notional) additions
to and the latter as subtractions from the stock of such labor. Since imports use more
unskilled labor per dollar of gross value than exports, and since the trade deficit means that
imports exceed exports, this exercise yields a substantial "addition" to America's unskilled
labor, thanks to her trade. Since further, in view of expanding trade deficits during the 80s,
this addition to the unskilled labor stock would have been accentuated, it would seem logical
to conclude that trade must have contributed pari passu to the observed decline in the real
wage of unskilled labor.18
This logic is indeed plausible. However, it runs into a problem The only way that
real wages can be affected is if, at constant (relative) factor prices, productivity increases or,
with productivity change ruled out, through a change in factor prices. Since the burden of
the explanation advanced is through exogenous trade changes, the analysis must presume
happens exogenously, would the real wages of the unskilled fall more or less if the economy
was in free trade rather than in autarky? Alternatively, we could ask whether exogenous
shifts in the trade offers of foreign nations in trade with us will help or harm unskilled
wages: a question which can be fitted more readily into the analysis in the text (since factor
prices again would change only insofar as goods prices change due to this exogenous shift
in the foreign offer curve).
We should stress that, in the following critique, we define the question of the impact
of trade on wages in the following policy-relevant sense (as stated in our Introduction): is
integration into the world economy through the reduction of trade barriers the cause of
decline in the real wage of the unskilled? That is also clearly the intent of the labor-
economists' studies, although the ones we call "early" studies do not specify a clear question
and a model which can analytically deal with it.
18Presumably they have in mind then an aggregate production function with diminishing
returns. See Section V below, however.
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a change in factor prices (unrelated to productivity change or other domestic factors). But
such a change in factor prices must reflect a trade-induced change in goods prices. Borjas,
Freeman and Katz should have investigated the change in goods prices, establishing that,
during the period that real wages of unskilled labor fell, the (relative) price of unskilled-
labor-intensive import-competing goods fell too. Else, their argument is incomplete and
hence cannot be accepted.
Deardorff and Staiger (1988) have shown that, under certain conditions, there will
exist a positive correlation between relative changes in factor prices and relative changes in
the factor content of trade. But their model still requires associated changes in goods
prices. Our objection is simply that if these changes in goods prices do not conform to what
is required, the observed correlation between changes in factor prices and factor content
must be dismissed as spurious. As noted below, both the earlier Bhagwati (1991a) and the
later Lawrence-Slaughter (1993) studies show that goods prices have changed in the opposite
direction to what is required for the SS explanation. Indeed, it is easy to see that the
Borjas-Freeman-Katz technique will conclude that real wages have fallen due to trade even
when they have not changed. Thus, consider the following simple analytics.
Consider Figure 1 where, for the US economy, the set of production possibilities
defined on the (only) two goods M and X is OTT, with TT as the "frontier". The goods
price-ratio(PM/PE) being the relative price of the two goods, is given internationally and,
at the outset, it is CP. Then, an efficient market economy will produce (at the tangency of
the price-line with TT) at P; consumption will be at C; and balanced trade will occur with
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In turn, the goods price-ratio will determine the factor price-ratio, as shown in Figure
2. Assume two factors of production, High School (HS) and College (C) graduates: the
former are unskilled and the latter are skilled. The importable industry is HS-intensive in
the sense that it uses, at any factor prices WHS/WC, a higher proportion of HS to C in
production than does X, the exportable industry. This is quite intuitive: if the industry M
using HS intensively suffers a reduced price, one would expect the (relative) reward of HS
to fall. This relationship is, of course, at the heart of the SS theorem.
Now, return to Figure 1. Assume that trade increases at constant goods prices (i.e.
without intensifying import competition), due to C shifting to Ci.19 Imports and exports
increase to CiR and PR respectively. The Borjas-Freeman-Katz calculation would show
now an increase in the notional addition to the American stock of HS. But nothing would
have happened to WHS/WC and to the real wage of HS since the goods price-ratio has not
changed.
Similarly, assume instead that the US now runs a trade deficit so that it can spend
AB more than its national income OA (measured in terms of good X). National
expenditure then takes place along BQ instead of the income-determined national-budget
line AC. Let the consumption bundle chosen then be C2, implying that the deficit is
associated with an equivalent increase in imports and leaves exports unchanged. The
Borjas-Freeman-Katz calculation will then show again that the endowment of HS has gone
up notionally since HS-intensive imports exceed HS-unintensive exports by the amount of


















the new deficit.20 But nothing again would have happened to WHS/WC and to the real
wages of HS in the US economy.
Thus, one cannot conclude with Borjas, Freeman and Katz that trade in the 1980s
depressed the real wages of the unskilled: their methodology can create invalid inferences
to that effect. More important, they do not show that the (domestic) prices of the
(unskilled-labor-intensive) import-competing goods fell relatively during the 1980s: without
that, they cannot invoke the SS or FPE variety of argumentation to "explain" the decline in
unskilled-labor wages. In fact, there does not seem to be any evidence that the (external)
terms of trade improved significantly in the 80s for the US, though this may have as much
to do with the lack of exogenous improvement as to the increased adoption of voluntary
export restraints which generally tend to transfer rents to exporters and thus to offset the
improvement in the terms of trade. At minimum, as noted by Bhagwati (1992a), if one
looks at the import and export price indices for manufactured goods (which exceed 90% in
weight in the overall indices) in Figure 3, the evidence points the other way: import prices
rise relative to export prices!21 A subsequent empirical study by Lawrence and Slaughter
(1993) has reinforced the Bhagwati critique. The authors find a rise in the relative price of
non-production-labor (i.e. skilled labor)-intensive goods as against production-labor (i.e.
unskilled labor)-intensive goods at the 2- and 3-digit SIC classification levels. This more
disaggregated analysis confirms the impression that our highly aggregated Figure 3 conveys,
20Even if we were to assume homothetic preferences, so that the consumption of both
goods increases in the same proportion, exports will fall, imports will rise, and once again
the notional endowment of HS will go up.
21See Bhagwati(1991a)(1991b).
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Figure 3
since both show that the relative prices have moved in the "wrong" direction as far as the
FPE-SS explanation is concerned.
A further critical piece of evidence presented by Lawrence and Slaughter is that most
sectors (again at the 2- and 3-digit levels) have become more intensive in their use of non-
production labor as compared to production labor in the 1980s, a fact which is at variance
with the FPE-SS approach, since a key implication of the FPE-SS hypothesis is that firms
in all sectors will economize on the more expensive factor (skilled labor) and hence become
more intensive in their use of unskilled labor.
This second piece of evidence, in conjunction with the first, effectively kills the FPE-
SS hypothesis as a tenable explanation of the phenomenon of the rising wage differential
and falling wages of the unskilled. The Borjas-Freeman-Katz conclusion that trade has
adversely affected wages may well be right; but their analysis does not show this, and we can
be quite confident that the FPE-SS explanation has been a red herring in the story.22
Technical Change: A Trade-Independent Explanation
On the other hand, both casual empiricism and the work of Mincer (1991), Davis and
Haltiwanger (1991) and Bound and Johnson (1992), suggest strongly that skills-based
technical change is the key culprit in the 1980s story and in the unfolding scenario for the
22It is worth noting that several partial-equilibrium studies of the effect of trade on
wages, which unlike Borjas-Freeman-Katz do use prices rather than quantities, most notably
Grossman (1986, 1987) and Revenga (1992), also fail to find a significant effect of trade on
wages in most of the industries studied.
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1990s and beyond.23
These labor economists cite the prototypical example of the computer revolution, a
whole spectrum of technological innovations which inherently require their users to have
skills which a College graduate should find it easier to acquire relative to a high school
graduate today. To put it another way, a computer with a single skilled operator can
replace a half-dozen unskilled typists: a phenomenon that we at this Workshop see in our
own Departmental offices and in the publishing houses that bring out our books. In fact,
the work of Mincer (1991) is extremely suggestive in this regard. Looking at R& D
expenditures per worker (Figure 4a) and deploying a simple model, he is able to predict
remarkably well (figure 4b) the College graduates' wage premia over the wages of High
School graduates.
If, as in Section V, we consider an aggregate production function approach, we can
see readily that unskilled-labor-saving technical change (in a two-factor framework with
skilled and unskilled labor) will reduce the wage differential and can depress the real wage
of unskilled labor (if the factor-substitution effect of the technical change is outweighed by
the overall-productivity effect).24
23The decline of unions, as discussed by Freeman (1991), the erosion of the real value
of the minimum wage, as discussed in Blackburn, Bloom, and Freeman (1990) and changes
in pay norms, as discussed by Mitchell (1989) are factors that, if taken into account, would
seem to mean that the pressure on real wages has been institutionally allowed to translate
into actual decline in them, whereas in the different, more "sheltering" type of EC
institutional setting, this pressure presumably causes relatively less decline in wages and
more increase in unemployment. For a recent comprehensive survey of alternative
explanations, see Levy and Murnane (1992).
^Diagrammatically, the latter relates to the upward rescaling of the isoquants whereas











































































































































































The analysis gets more complex when we disaggregate the economy, as in the trade-
theoretic models, into two sectors with different factor intensities. The effect on the wage
differential and the real wage of the unskilled will depend then on the overall rate of
change, how biased it is against unskilled labor and its relative incidence in the two sectors.
Thus, if the change is uniformly spread in both sectors, and the economy remains
diversified in the new equilibrium at the old goods and factor price-ratios, the result will be
to maintain the wage differential: the factor price-ratio corresponding to the goods price-
ratio will not change after the uniform technical change, whether Hicks-neutral or biased.25
While the real wage of unskilled labor will surely rise with Hicks-neutral technical change,
it may not however if the technical change is (pro-) skills-biased (and the bias effect
outweighs the overall-productivity effect).
We would then argue that the disaggregated-sectors model suggests that the happy
experience of the 1950s and 1960s may have been due to technical change that was
substantial, was more uniformly spread among exportables and importables, and was more
neutral than biased whereas, in the 1980s, it has probably been slower (perhaps due to
slowed investment and hence slower absorption of new technology), has been more focused
on skills-intensive exportables and has been also more skills-biased. Taken in conjunction,
these three factors would tend to widen the wage differential while putting downward
to unskilled labor chosen rises as is consistent with the evidence (see Section II).
goods price-ratio can itself change if the country's terms of trade are variable:
demand conditions then would have to be considered as well to determine the new
equilibrium goods and hence, factor price ratios.
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pressure simultaneously on the real wages of the unskilled.26 Of course, these ideas need
to be tested empirically.
But the preceding analysis takes technical change to be exogenous to trade. Larry
Mishel has rightly raised the question: if trade competition induces technical change, could
we not then relate the effects on real wages back again to trade? Our judgement, however,
is that this would work against, not in favor of, those who think that trade is adversely
affecting the real wages of the unskilled. For, if we proceed along the assumption that trade
competition induces neutral technical change in the import-competing unskilled-labor-
intensive industries, this should raise, not lower, the real wage of the unskilled. Again, if
we assume instead that trade exerts a little downward pressure on the real wages of the
unskilled and that the search for technical innovation is biased in favor of economizing the
use of the factors of production whose wages are rising instead, the effect again will be to
reinforce the conclusion that trade-induced technical change helps, not hurts, the real wages
of the unskilled.27
26These ideas were explored in the context of a general-equilibrium model of 2 tradeable
goods and 2 factors plus a nontrades "services" sector, using the Komiya model, in Bhagwati
(1991a)(1991b).
27See the discussion of the Kennedy-Weizsacker theory of induced technical change in
Samuelson (1965).
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III. KALEIDOSCOPIC COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE:
FOOTLOOSE INDUSTRIES AND LABOR TURNOVER
The technical-change-based explanation, of course, takes us away from trade as a
cause of the phenomenon of depressed real wages of the unskilled. Indeed, it was the
difficulty we had with the FPE-cum-SS-theoretic approach to this conundrum that helped
focus on this alternative explanation.
But if the obvious FPE-SS type trade explanation is not compelling, all is not lost.
It is possible to develop an alternative trade-based explanation (Bhagwati, 1991a; 1991b)
which departs altogether from the FPE-SS approach. We doubt that this alternative
explanation can carry the weight that the technical-change (and technological) explanation
probably does; but it could well be a contributory factor of some, perhaps also growing,
importance.
The new hypothesis comes from the observation that the world economy is now
increasingly integrated and that the convergence of technology among the OECD countries
and the spread of global multinational corporations around the world have brought many
modern industries within the grasp of countries. Many more industries therefore are
"footloose" than before: small shifts in costs can cause comparative advantage to shift
suddenly from one country to another.28 Thus, we suspect that comparative advantage has,
over time, become kaleidoscopic: one country may have comparative advantage in X and
another in Y today, and tomorrow it may suddenly go the other way. This volatility in a
is is also the view implicit in the imperfect-competition worlds of symmetric firms
although the analysis often goes in the direction of arguing how footloose industries land in
one rather than another country as scale economies are exploited.
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comparative advantage will have two serious consequences.
The first is that there will be far greater sensitivity to notions of Fair Trade. Firms
will be looking over one another's shoulders to see if that lethal epsilon advantage enjoyed
by the other firm is because of some (unfair) domestic institution or policy on its home turf.
Demands for "level playing fields" will multiply. They have, as we have already noted in
Section I.
The second is that the volatility in comparative advantage will generally imply, ceteris
paribus, more labor turnover. Thus the frictional or "natural" unemployment should rise, as
it appears to have in the 1980s. But the added turnover, in turn, could mean that the
growth curve of earnings may become flatter because a more mobile labor force could be
accumulating less skills: as put in Bhagwati (1991a) (1991b), a rolling stone gathers no moss
and a moving worker gathers no skills. As it happens, a forthcoming study by the OECD,
reported on by The Economist (1993) in the Economics Focus column entitled "Musical
Chairs", confirms this conjecture:
So the OECD concludes that there is a clear link between employment
stability and skill training. But which causes which? Most likely the two are
mutually reinforcing: too high a rate of labor turnover discourages investment
in work-place skills; and workers who get no training are likely to show less
commitment to their current employer and so may change jobs more often.
A vicious circle develops as higher labor turnover produces a less trained and
hence a less loyal workforce.
Then, we get a trade-dependent explanation as to why increased labor turnover
reduces, ceteris paribus, the real wage of unskilled labor. But what about the wage
differential between unskilled and skilled labor? Our argument seems to apply symmetrically
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to all labor. Therefore to produce an explanation of increased wage differential as well, we
would have to introduce some source of asymmetry which (relatively) shields the skilled
from the "rolling-stone-gathers-no-moss" effect.
Such an asymmetry may accrue from the greater transferability of work-place-
acquired skills by the skilled: e.g. an accountant handling IBM can shift his acquired
knowhow readily to a new job at Caterpillar or Chrysler, whereas working better on the
assembly line for autos at Ford may not transfer to working at a blast furnace in Pittsburgh
or for that matter to flipping hamburgers at MacDonalds.
Again, the fallow "search"-period spells between jobs are probably used by College
graduates (the skilled) to retool and acquire added and more suitable skills-
having learnt once, you can and will learn again—whereas High School graduates and
dropouts (the unskilled) are less likely to do so, having not learnt in the first place. We can
only offer these ideas as speculation; empirical knowledge is hard to come by on this
particular hypothesis. Mincer and Higuchi (1988) is one study which attempts to link labor
turnover and the wage structure. While not directly addressing the hypothesis we have
advanced, this study could provide the basis for its empirical investigation. Furthermore,
Steve Davis has suggested to us that one useful empirical construct which could be brought
to bear on the hypothesis is the tenure distribution in various disaggregated sectors of the
economy. If sectors which were exposed to the"rolling-stone-gathers-no-moss" effect of the
type discussed here also exhibited leftward shifts in the tenure distributions, especially of
unskilled workers, then this would be consistent with the hypothesis and might therefore
constitute partial corroboration of it.
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"A Rolling Stone Gathers No Moss" Model
We can readily sketch the essential structure of the foregoing argument in the 2x2
framework.29 Let the economy be small, i.e. the terms of trade are given and invariant to
its trade. Let two goods, X and Y, be produced according to standard neoclassical
production functions with the use of two factors, skilled labor, H, and unskilled labor, L,
which throughout are in fixed supply. Suppose as well that the terms of trade are such that
this economy exports good X and that the economy remains within the (Chipman-
McKenzie) diversification cone.
To capture the notion of volatility in the terms of trade, suppose a two-period
structure in which the terms of trade of the skilled-labor-intensive good initially improve but
then return to their original level, i.e. suppose that the initial relative price of good X in
terms of good Y is p, then it becomes p', p'>p, and finally returns to p.30
As regards the accumulation of human capital, this for simplicity is assumed to take
place between periods, i.e. between the period in which terms of trade p' and p prevail.
Suppose that both types of labor, skilled and unskilled, acquire human capital through
learning-by-doing, which is modelled as an augmentation of the effective stocks of the two
29Cf. Dehejia (1992b). The model is set up to generate, not merely the adverse effect
on the real wage of the unskilled, but also a widening differential between the wages of the
unskilled and the skilled. While we use the words "skilled" and "unskilled", Alan Deardorff
has correctly noted that, since both types of labor can acquire skills but only differentially
as assumed, it would be better to think of College and High School graduates, as earlier in
this paper.
^In more general form, we can envisage a stochastic process for the terms of trade in
which there are stationary disturbances around some trend growth rate (which may be zero,
in which case the terms of trade would be pure white noise). Cf. Dehejia (1992b).
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types of labor, H and L. Crucially, skilled labor, H, augments at the same rate in either
sector, X or Y, and this augmentation is assumed to be unaffected by a shift of skilled labor
between sectors.
Therefore, suppose that H augments at the end of the two periods to <SH, S > 1,
where S is the gross rate of growth of the effective stock of H. By contrast, unskilled labor,
L, augments only if it remains in the same sector but is assumed not to augment if it moves
between sectors. Therefore, total augmentation of the effective stock of unskilled labor, L,
is <S(L-AL) + AL, where AL is the amount of unskilled labor that moves between sectors X
and Y in response to the initial terms of trade shift from p to p'.
This is illustrated in Figure 5 with the aid of the family Edgeworth-Bowley box
diagram. Let OPP'O' be the contract curve. At the initial terms of trade, the economy is
at point P on OPP'O'. The change in the terms of trade from p to p' induces a shift in the
equilibrium to a new point,P', along OPP'O'. Drop vertical lines from P and P' to the
horizontal axis and label the corresponding points A and B, respectively. Then AL is equal
to the distance AB along the horizontal axis.
In the final equilibrium, when the terms of trade have returned to p, there is no
change in the real wage per effective unit of skilled or unskilled labor. However, the
effective stocks per worker of the two factors now differ due to differential augmentation
induced by the fluctuation of p to p' before its return to p. The effective stock of skilled
labor is now SH whereas the effective stock of unskilled labor is now <S (L-AL) + AL.31 This
31This model assumes that real wages will adjust immediately and fully to terms of trade
changes. But in reality there are often lags. Besides, if one thinks of models of labor hiring













differential augmentation induces a Rybczynski (1955)-type reallocation of resources from
the unskilled labor-intensive sector, Y, to the skilled labor-intensive sector X, with however
no effect on the real wage per effective worker of either type, since diversification is
assumed.
However, although real wages per effective worker are unchanged, the observed real
wages per worker now differ. Recall that H and L represent total effective stocks of skilled
and unskilled labor, respectively. Normalizing the populations of skilled and unskilled labor
to unity for simplicity, H and L may thus be interpreted as the total stock of skilled labor
per skilled laborer and the total stock of unskilled labor per unskilled laborer, respectively.
Initially, the real wage of a skilled worker is WHH and that of an unskilled worker WHL,
where WH and WL are the respective real wages per effective worker.
At the end, real wages per effective worker, WH and WL, are unchanged, but real
wages per worker have increased to WH«SH and [WL<S(L-AL) + AL] respectively.
Thus, while real wages per worker of both skilled and unskilled labor have increased
due to on-the-job human capital accumulation, skilled labor becomes relatively better off
(as compared to the initial situation) than unskilled labor. The real income of unskilled
labor will thus be lower as compared to a situation with no terms of trade volatility in this
model, due not to the SS effect on real wages (as discussed in Section II), but due to
differential human capital accumulation which leaves unskilled labor relatively poorly
endowed with human capital at the end, unlike skilled labor which by the model's
firms will not adjust their employment to every change in the price of their output. Models
that incorporate these ideas should nonetheless show that increased volatility of goods prices
will be associated with increased volatility of factor prices.
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assumption is impervious to the volatility in the terms of trade. It is evident that the real
wage per unskilled laborer will be lower than if the rolling-stone-gather-no-moss effect were
absent.
A multi-period version of this model has been analyzed by Dehejia (1992b),
combining the analytics of the 2x2 model of trade theory with the twin new assumptions of
the rolling-stone-gathers-no-moss hypothesis on skills acquisition and that the terms of trade
of this small country evolve according to a pure white noise stochastic process, so that the
terms of trade have no trend but fluctuate noisily around some (unspecified) long-run level
due to (unspecified) worldwide technology or taste shocks.
The simulation runs of the wage differentials (per worker)32 which the model then
generates, as per our hypothesis due to the terms of trade fluctuations and the induced
divergence of skills acquisition between the "skilled" and "unskilled" workers, do indeed show
a rising time trend. Simulation runs by Dehejia on different values of the terms of trade
noise parameter bear out the intuitive notion that, the higher this parameter and hence the
greater the volatility in the terms of trade, the larger also is the wage-differential effect that
is generated.33
32The wages per effective worker (i.e. for given skill) remain constant in expected value
terms by model specification of stationary white noise disturbances to the terms of trade.
The trend change in a worker's real wage can come only from the acquisition of more skills
in this model.
33For details, see Dehejia (1992b). The simulations are necessary because an analytical
solution to the model is not possible due to the inherent nonlinearity in the key equation
defining the time path of effective skilled-to-unskilled labor in the model.
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Hysteresis: An Alternative Link Between Kaleidoscopic
Comparative Advantage and Wages
The modelling hitherto simply embodied, in the otherwise-static framework, the
"rolling-stone-gathers-no-moss" idea. There were no "supply-side" effects in the sense that
each of the two types of labor followed its own skills-acquisition trajectory as influenced
critically by the kaleidoscopic-comparative-advantage-implied volatility in the terms of trade.
But, of course, the two groups are not pre-determined and nonintersecting over time.
The "unskilled" (High School graduates and also dropouts) can, and do, become "skilled"
(College graduates and more) if the rewards are enticing. In the foregoing model, if the
unskilled could costlessly become skilled, the relative supply of skilled labor would be
infinitely elastic at a zero differential; that is, any wage differential induced by terms of
trade shifts would instantaneously disappear, which obviously is unrealistic.
But, to allow for costly fixed investment to enter the "skilled" group, we can
realistically explore further the wage-differential and wage effect of volatility in the terms
of trade. To do this, we must obviously introduce hysteresis into the analysis.34 We now
indicate how this might be done.
Thus, take again as our starting point increased volatility in the terms of trade and
introduce Dixit-style hysteresis in the following simple way. Thus, suppose that unskilled
a recent survey and synthesis of results in the investment and hysteresis literature,
see Dixit (1992), on which we draw below.
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workers can transform themselves into skilled workers by incurring an irreversible fixed cost
K.35 Suppose next that the relative reward to being skilled versus being unskilled
fluctuates stochastically (due to fluctuations in the terms of trade) according to a geometric
Brownian motion process (the continuous time analogue of the random walk in discrete
time). Under the critical assumption of a fixed cost of investment in an environment
characterized by ongoing uncertainty, there will then exist a band of inaction, or a hysteresis
region, in which the wage differential (the excess return to being skilled versus being
unskilled) will be positive and in which there will be no supply response by unskilled
workers to eliminate this differential.
It is important to note that hysteresis per se arises due to the existence of linear
adjustment technology (i.e. a fixed cost of retraining per worker) as opposed to neoclassical
convex adjustment technology. Even in the absence of uncertainty, there will exist an
inaction region which no retraining will take place. In a world without uncertainty,
retraining will occur at the Marshallian investment trigger M, where M is defined by:
= pK,
where p is individuals' pure rate of time preference (which we can assume equals the
interest rate). By assumption of the model, sufficient retraining will occur when the trigger
35Formally, we must assume for analytical tractability in this simple model that the
skilled can costlessly become unskilled. For professors who see how rapidly most students
forget a subject once the examinations are over, this may well be the most realistic
assumption in this paper!
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is reached to ensure that the wage differential will never exceed pK. Thus, for example, if
it costs $100,000 for an unskilled worker to "upskill", so that K= 100,000, and if the interest
rate is equal to 5 per cent, so that p =0.05, then the maximum sustainable wage differential,
which is equal to the Marshallian investment trigger M, is given by (.05 x 100,000) or $5,000.
I.e. the skilled job must pay $5,000 more than the unskilled job to elicit a supply response
and further (in this simple model) this is also the maximum differential consistent with labor
market equilibrium.36
The effect of uncertainty is essentially to widen the hysteresis region by increasing
the investment trigger from M, given above, to H, where:
H=p'K,
where the interest rate p must be replaced by an adjusted interest rate p', where p' > p. The
precise definition of p' is furnished in Dixit (1992). It suffices for our purposes here to
notice that the existence of uncertainty can make p' exceed p by an amount which is not
trivial. Thus, sticking to the example in which p =0.05, if we assume that a, the coefficient
of variation of the Brownian motion, is 0.2 (i.e. the standard deviation is 20 per cent of the
mean of the distribution) — a magnitude of uncertainty by no means very large — then p'
is shown by Dixit to equal 0.093, i.e. 9.3 per cent, giving a maximum wage differential of
$9,300.
Intuitively, in an inherently uncertain economic environment in which investment is
details see Dixit (1992).
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costly and irreversible (in the sense that an unskilled worker once she spends K to upskill
can never recover the investment), an unskilled worker will be reluctant to upskill because
there is always the danger that the skill differential will drop after the costly investment is
made. Of course, even in the presence of uncertainty, given a big enough wage differential,
an unskilled worker will still be willing to upskill.
The existence of uncertainty essentially serves to attach a risk premium to the
investment decision to upskill which will raise the "hurdle rate" on the investment.
Furthermore, it is intuitively appealing (and is proved rigorously by Dixit) that this risk
premium increases with the magnitude of uncertainty. Thus, in the numerical example
above, if p remains at 5 per cent but o is now set to 0.4, then p' jumps to 0.166, or 16.6 per
cent - a very high hurdle rate indeed - which raises the maximum skill differential that the
labor market will sustain to $16,600.
The connection between the Dixit-type hysteresis model and the assumption of terms
of trade volatility made in this section thus becomes apparent. If indeed our assumption
that the 1980s have witnessed increased volatility in the terms of trade and hence an
increased induced volatility in the (relative-demand-driven-) wage differential is correct, then
the model suggests that in this increasingly uncertain economic environment, unskilled
workers become increasingly reluctant to upskill and hence that wage differentials that are
larger than the historical norm will likely be observed.
Thus consider for illustration Figure 6. Let Ho be the investment trigger corresponding
to an initial low level of uncertainty before the 1980s (a0) and let H2>HO be the new, higher
investment trigger corresponding to a new higher level of uncertainty in the 1980s (CTJ).
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Then, the wage differential, which fluctuates stochastically in the smaller inaction band
before the 1980s, breaks through its historical ceiling at date t', and rises above Ho, since
now the new trigger level Hj is applicable. It is not until date t" that the wage differential
reaches its new ceiling, given by Hl5 after which it cannot perforce rise any more. Thus, if
f is say 1980, and t" is some indeterminate date in the future, then the time interval [t',tM]
would be characterized by rising wage differential. This would seem puzzling to those
accustomed to Ho as the old maximum wage differential (and which would be presumably
thought of as the historical norm if Ho had persisted for a long enough time) but makes
sense once it is understood that the level of uncertainty has increased.
The strength of this model, simple as it is, is that not only does it build on the
assumption of kaleidoscopic comparative advantage and hence volatility of terms of trade
as was the "rolling-stone-gathers-no-moss" model above, but further it is ground firmly in
individual choice-theoretic terms and can help to explain the puzzle (first noted, it seems,
by Jacob Mincer) that the 1980s and early 1990s have witnessed wage differentials well
above historical norms and that relative supply responses have been muted compared to
what they were during previous episodes of relatively high wage differentials.
An important corollary follows from this model. Since the action points are
individually optimal in this model and since, in the absence of any distortions in the system,
those points are therefore also the social action points, it follows that the bigger wage
differentials observed in periods characterized by higher uncertainty are also socially
optimal, provided that such increased uncertainty is treated as truly exogenous and produced






In other words, in an inherently more uncertain environment, unskilled workers are
doing the smart thing in delaying their decision to upskill and hence the big wage
differential that we observe today should not of itself be of policy concern. Government
policy to narrow the differential by, say, subsidizing retraining by unskilled workers would
be harmful in that some unskilled workers would be induced by the government subsidy
scheme to retrain whereas they had previously optimally chosen to remain unskilled since
the increment to their income due to upskilling would not be large enough to warrant the
investment.
Legitimate policy concerns about the incomes of the unskilled should therefore be
met not by implementing retraining schemes but by direct lump sum income transfers to
them which would accomplish the income distributional goals of policy without distorting
incentives pertaining to the upskilling investment decision.
This conclusion, of course, presumes that the reduced real wages of the unskilled
produced by other reasons (such as the rolling-stone-gathers-no-moss effect) have not
produced an imperfection in the credit market for borrowing to educate oneself, whose
effect in the context of the previous model is effectively to increase the private hurdle rate
to some p"> p' whereas the social hurdle rate remains p'. If such distortions have emerged
in the 1980s, that would provide an independent argument for subsidizing training and
education to the High School graduates (and dropouts), the objective then being to subsidise
the unskilled workers to the extent that the gap (p" - p') is eliminated.
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IV. TRADE AND RENTS
We now turn to yet another, more conventional trade-related explanation which
builds on the incorporation of imperfectly competitive factor markets into the picture. Thus,
it is often claimed, especially for autos and steel but also more generally now, that
international competition has led to the erosion of high-wage jobs: either they have
disappeared or the wages on such "good" jobs have been scaled down.
If we merely mean that the decline in the product prices of these sectors is putting
downward pressure on labor that is specific to them or is intensively used in them, the
resulting decline in the real wage of such labor is simply the SS phenomenon. The present
argument is rather that identical-quality labor is getting a higher wage (and hence a rent)
in the import-competing sectors and that this rent will be reduced in the new equilibrium
or that the number of people enjoying unchanged rents (i.e. the number of good jobs) will
be reduced, thanks to the import competition (i.e. improved terms of trade).
The prior questions, of course, before we consider this argument analytically are
twofold: (i) is there any evidence that there are such rents; and (ii) why do these rents
exist?
The chief source of the current acceptance of the importance of rents in labor
markets is the empirical work of Katz and Summers (1989a)( 1989b) for US industries for
1984. They estimate the interindustry dispersion of wages, controlling then for explanatory
variables but finding that the standard deviation of the estimated wage differentials falls
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from 28% without these controls to 15% with them, thus leaving a residual which is then
assigned to rents. However, the recent work of Jacob Mincer (1993) by adding better
estimates of training and other variables and using different data sets, has succeeded in
wiping out more than half of the Katz-Summers residual, leaving too emasculated a result
to base serious explanations and policy conclusions on.37
But assuming that the rents were significant, what could they be due to? The obvious
answer is that the rents are obtained and protected by trade unions, which is surely true for
the two major tradeable sectors that have faced import competition: autos and steel. In the
more diffused analysis that Katz and Summers deploy, extended to aggregated groups of
industries in the US, accounting for unions nonetheless leaves a residual to be explained by
other factors. The authors then opt for an efficiency wage explanation of the type produced
by Leibenstein and Mirrlees many years ago via the productivity effects of higher wages
from better nourishment in the context of developing countries and now extended to
developed countries in the shape of raising the cost of being fired and hence increasing
efficiency in jobs where shirking is possible. As far as we can tell, Katz and Summers do
not explore the technology of the industries where they do find significant non-union-related
rents to see if the hypothesis of shirking makes sense. It would appear to us that in sectors
such as services (where one might be working on one's own in relation to customers)
shirking is easier than in manufacturing (where shirking may be difficult because of being
on a tight assembly line with many others on it) and yet the rents seem to be higher in the
37This is not to say that the efficiency-wage models are not of great intellectual interest.
Their relevance to the issue at hand is what we doubt.
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latter than in the former. Then again, the rents seem to obtain in all jobs in an industry
rather than in specific jobs in it; but it is hard to see why technology should be such that
shirking obtains for all operations in an industry! Then again, Jacob Mincer's forthcoming
work shows that the average time spent in queue for the higher-wage jobs is not less than
elsewhere, suggesting that the higher wages are for better people, whereas the "rent"
explanation would suggest longer wait-time instead.
For these reasons, we do not pursue the idea of modelling here the effect of import
competition on rents in efficiency-wage models. Besides, a scanning of the Katz-Summers
findings by industry does not suggest any relationship between rents in an industry and its
status as a nontradeable or tradeable and, if tradeable, as an exportable or an importable.
We therefore confine ourselves to modelling the effect of import competition, i.e. of fall in
world prices, on trade-union-generated rents and jobs.
Consider then a simple general-equilibrium insider-outsider model, as in Figure 7.
Suppose that the economy consists of 2 sectors: A (autos) and R (the rest). Suppose that
the workers in sector R are competitive whereas the auto workers are controlled by a
union.38 Suppose further that the union insiders are OA in number. OO' is the total labor
force. PA is the relative price of autos and MPs are the marginal product curves, measured
for R from O' and for A from O as the origins. With OA insiders, whose full employment
it will ensure, the auto union will then bargain for (and we assume that the firms will
accept) the wage rate OW.














Now, there are at least three ways to close the model in terms of labor market
behavior in the rest of the economy:
First, we can assume that the union-determined wage has such widespread appeal
that it perhaps becomes legislated into an economy-wide minimum wage of OW. In that
case, employment in the rest of the economy will be O'B, and unemployment of magnitude
AB will be observed.
Second, we can assume that the wage in the rest of the economy falls sufficiently to
ensure economy-wide full employment. In that case, wage OV will obtain in the rest of the
economy, which is lower by VW than the union wage in that auto sector, and A C workers
will be employed in the rest of the economy, with no unemployment.
Third, there may be a convex combination of (i) and (ii), in that wages in the rest of
the economy may be below OW but not far enough below to eliminate all unemployment.
A version of this third hypothesis is essentially the Harris-Todaro model from development
theory.39 We will work with the second hypothesis, since that is consistent with the wage
differentials observed by Katz and Summers (1989a)( 1989b) and does not involve
unemployment, which is not central to the current discussion and would only complicate
matters unnecessarily.
Now, to tell the 'rent-squeezing' story, suppose a deterioration in the terms of trade
for autos vis-a-vis other goods. This implies an inward shift of the marginal product of labor
schedule, MPA, in proportion to the terms of trade change. If this change is anticipated by
insiders, they will bargain for wage OX, which ensures full employment by insiders.
39Cf. Harris and Todaro (1970) and Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1974).
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Nominal wage will fall to OX, but notice that the real wage denominated in terms of autos
has remained constant since nominal wages fall in proportion to the fall in the terms of
trade. Since by construction the numeraire is all other goods, the real wage will have fallen
in terms of all other goods. Thus, insider autoworkers will typically perceive a fall in their
real wages (unless they consume only autos for breakfast instead of Corn Flakes), but
insider employment will be protected.40
Consider an alternative scenario in which the fall in the terms of trade was
unexpected by the union. Then, the union will bargain for and receive wage OW, but labor
demand will fall short of MPA. Thus the number of insiders will shrink to OC, with the
disenfranchised insiders joining low-paid workers in the rest of the economy and earning the
low wage OY. Now, what has happened to real wages? Since the nominal wage didn't
change, the real wage in terms of autos goes up (since the price of autos went down) and
since other goods are our numeraire, the real wage in terms of other goods stays constant.
Thus, the real wage for the few insiders who are still employed will rise or stay roughly
constant, but will not fall. Good jobs will shrink, becoming even better jobs, and bad jobs
will increase.
The two stories above at a very crude level might seem to fit the stylized facts of the
US and EC respectively. In the US, wages appear to be flexible downward, thus insider
employment levels in autos and steel are essentially unchanged. In EC, by contrast, wages
have been rigid and employment in autos, etc. has been falling. If this simple insider-
40The real wage of R-workers will, however, rise because of cheaper autos, thus diluting
the overall reduction in the real wage of workers.
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outsider model is correct, the explanation would have to be either that in the US unions
expected the shock and thus bargained for lower wages and unions in Europe did not, or
(stepping beyond the model) unions in Europe stuck fast for high wages as they were
presumably concerned about the 'super-insiders' OC whereas unions in the US cared about
OA and thus let wages fall.41
V. AGGREGATE PRODUCTION FUNCTION: THE ULTIMATE THREAT?
The models deployed in the foregoing analysis have been disaggregated (at least two
sectors, exportables and importables) and in general equilibrium. But suppose that you
think in terms of an aggregate production function for the entire economy.
This makes it analytically impossible to consider trade questions meaningfully. But
it is perfectly compatible with thinking about the effects of accumulation and of technical
change. [The real problem with it is that it can be quite misleading since disaggregation
shows, as trade theorists are aware, that effects such as diminishing returns which seem
natural and inevitable in the context of aggregate production functions can be eliminated
by compositional effects. Thus, for example, if David Card's (1990) findings on the failure
41Thea Lee has suggested that the effect of trade competition may simply be to weaken
the unions' bargaining power generally. Thus, a shift from protecting insiders' wages to
protecting their employment may soon yield to inability to be taken seriously and hence
their demise eventually. If so, "rents" defining some jobs as "better" than other jobs will
obviously tend to vanish with the unions.
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of the Mariel influx of Cubans into Miami are correct, and there was no effect of the
substantial influx on real wages in Miami, that may well be because, as the Rybczynski
(1955) theorem underlines, the added labor may have been absorbed at constant goods and
factor prices by relative expansion of labor-intensive activities: a hypothesis that we suspect
has not been examined.]
Using then the aggregate production function approach, suppose that we allow
explicitly for three factors: capital (K), skilled labor (Ls) and unskilled labor (Lu). Then
take a nested CES production function which captures the idea that K and Ls are relatively
complementary as compared to Lu.42 In that case, the marginal product of Lu, and hence
its real wage, will Ml as capital accumulates. Technology is thus not kind to unskilled labor:
the traditional engine for growth, Marx's primitive accumulation, hurts unskilled labor
instead of improving its real wage. The same applies, of course, if we receive net inflows
of foreign investment: Perot gets to stand on his head!
Furthermore, technical change accentuates this phenomenon in the production
function above43 as indeed in the real world, as the recent work on technical change seems
42Such a production function is:
Y = {«S[aK-pl + (l-a)Ls-pl]p2/pl + (
where the condition that pi > p2 guarantees that capital K and skilled Labor Ls have a
lower Hicks-Allen partial substitution elasticity than K and unskilled labor Lu, so that
capital-skill complementarity holds in a relative sense. The production function is from
Layard and Walters (1978). The original work on the 3-factor production function, with the
thesis that capital is more complementary with skilled labor, is due to Griliches (1969).
More recent evidence is presented in Bartel and Lichtenberg (1987) and Berndt and
Morrison (1991).
43This is easily verified by multiplying the production function in the preceding footnote
with a technology shift parameter, A, and then showing that the marginal product of
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to confirm [e.g. Krueger (1993)]. Then, we have a real problem on our hands: both sources
of growth, capital accumulation (including inward foreign investment) and technical change
will harm unskilled labor. That becomes then the ultimate threat. Marx indeed is striking
again.
Once again, the analysis exaggerates and misleads. Compositional effects can kill the
operation of the adverse effect within each industry. Then again, supply response by the
unskilled to get skilled as the returns to skills rise, will reduce ceteris paribus the supply of
unskilled labor and increase that of the skilled, thus tending to make the widened
differential in rewards to the skilled relative to the unskilled a transitory phenomenon. The
"adjustment process" whereby the unskilled become skilled, turning the differential back
towards its original position, depends of course on the cost of such skill-acquisition.44
We may conjecture here, however, that the adjustment may have become more costly,
and hence the widening of the wage differential more persistent, in the 1980s due to
phenomena such as the rise of lucrative alternatives such as drug-dealing, the fall in the
quality of schools and the collapse of the family and hence the motivation and aptitude for
getting educated among those affected (as in inner cities).
unskilled labor (the partial derivative of Y with respect to Lu) is decreasing in A.
transition-path and the steady-state properties of such an adjustment process have
been examined in Dehejia (1992a).
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VI. CONCLUDING REMARK
Our review and analysis of alternative theoretical ways in which freer trade may
affect real wages of the unskilled suggests several areas for further investigation.
But it also indicates that the empirical evidence to date fails to put the burden of the
explanation for the observed decline in real wages of the unskilled on freer trade, leaving
technology and technical change as the key culprits.
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